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FEMINIST STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Kim Brooks*

Leading Canadian scholar Ruth Sullivan describes the act of statutory
interpretation as a mix of art and archeology.1 Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Tax Opinions affirms her assessment.2 If the act of statutory interpretation
requires us to deploy our interdisciplinary talents, at least somewhat
unmoored from the constraints of formal expressions of legal doctrine, why
haven’t feminists been more inclined to write about statutory interpretation?
Put another way, some scholars acknowledge that judges “are subtly
influenced by preconceptions, endemic privilegings and power hierarchies,
and prevailing social norms and ‘conventional’ wisdom.”3 Those influences
become the background for how judges read legislation.4 Yet, there is
surprisingly little literature about how feminists (or feminist decisionmakers) do or could approach statutory interpretation projects.5
Feminist Judgments offers concrete illustrations of how feminists,
charged with authoring feminist judgments, go about the work of statutory
interpretation in tax law.6 The editors of the collection did not constrain the
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RUTH SULLIVAN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 29 (3d ed. 2016).

2

Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, Introduction to the Feminist Judgments: Rewritten
Tax Opinions Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN TAX OPINIONS 6–8 (Bridget J. Crawford &
Anthony C. Infanti eds., 2017).
3

Id. at 6.

4

Id.

5

This is in contrast to a developed literature on feminist judging and feminist legal theory and
method. See, e.g., Rosemary Hunter, Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF.
7, 7, 30 (2008); Mary Jane Mossman, Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes, 3 AUSTL.
J.L. & SOC’Y 30 (1986).
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meaning of feminism,7 nor did they articulate what they believed was a
“feminist” interpretation.8 To that end, the collection offers fertile ground for
scholars who might wish to theorize about feminist statutory interpretation.
What principles of interpretation might be distilled?
This essay offers some preliminary reflections on what feminist
statutory interpretation in tax entails, using the eleven decisions (and the
attendant commentaries) presented in the collection as source material.9 Ten
principles are proposed as a way of generating discussion about an
undertheorized area of feminist scholarship (statutory interpretation).
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, feminist statutory interpretation
acknowledges that “who is doing the interpreting matters.”10 This principle
aligns with the widely accepted feminist insight that “neutral rules and
procedures tend to drive underground the ideologies of the
decisionmaker. . . . Disadvantaged by hidden bias, feminists see the value of
modes of legal reasoning that expose and open up debate concerning the
underlying political and moral considerations.”11 The authors of each chapter
in Feminist Judgments craft their decisions in ways that diverge from the
original judgments. In some cases, they author new majorities; in some,
dissents; and in others, they concur. But key to the rewriting exercise, as
feminists, their process of applying statutory provisions to facts leads to
different reasoning and in some cases different outcomes. Even though they
are relying on the same precedents available to the original courts, who the
authors are has had an effect on the interpretation of the law. Patricia Cain’s
decision about how transfers on the completion of a relationship should be
treated for tax purposes throws into stark relief the different type of approach
that can be brought to bear on a tax issue as a result of the person authoring

7
The “call for participation . . . stated that [the editors] . . . conceive[d] of feminism as a broad
movement concerned with justice and equality and that [they] welcomed proposals to rewrite cases in a
way that brings into focus issues such as gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, and immigration status.” Crawford & Infanti, supra note 2, at 9.
8

Id.

9

Id. at 11.
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Id. at 7.

11

Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 862–63 (1990).
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the decision.12 Key in her decision is a close examination into the nature of
women’s lived experiences.13 Patricia Cain has made a signature contribution
in the tax law scholarship on gender equality.14 Her lived experience must
have helped her in shaping her approach to the decision and, compared to the
original decision, that orientation shows.15
Second, decision-makers cannot escape who they are, but they can bring
an open mind to the exercise of understanding how multiple interpretive
communities would approach the interpretive problem before them. Being
conscious that we are not “perspectiveless” facilitates our efforts to make
sense of and incorporate other world views into our decision-making.16 The
decision authored by David Brennen exemplifies this approach.17 Brennen
authors a concurring opinion in a decision about whether a private university
that engages in discrimination against racial minorities should be precluded
from accessing tax-exempt status.18 The original judgment denied taxexempt status on the grounds of that racial discrimination;19 however,
Brennen (a man) looks at how gender and race intersect to hold that when
you look at the range of affected interpretive communities—here, women of
color—it becomes clear that the discrimination is not limited to race.20 By
keeping an open mind and listening to people with alternative experiences to
his own (specifically in this instance, women of color), Brennen is able to

12

Patricia A. Cain, United States v. Davis, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 129.

13

Id.

14

Id.

15

Id.

16

See, e.g., Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L.
REV. 95, 95, 110 (1990).
17
David A. Brennen, Bob Jones University v. United States, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
2, at 150.
18

Id. at 150.

19

Elaine Waterhouse Wilson, Commentary on Bob Jones University v. United States, in FEMINIST
JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 140.
20

Brennen, supra note 17, at 156; Wilson, supra note 19, at 144.
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author a decision that speaks in a more thorough way to the communities
affected by the judgment.21
Third, feminists who engage in statutory interpretation accept the
linguistic insight that no words have inherent meaning.22 This seems a simple
point; yet, it remains hotly contested among the scholars of statutory
interpretation. In the context of critical race theory, Andre Smith puts it this
way:
. . . a thorough consideration of plain meaning must include the meanings
attributed to a word by different ‘interpretive communities,’ to the extent such
meanings differ from the dominant one. Judges trying to gather the plain meaning
of ‘Direct Tax’ in the U.S. Constitution must research and incorporate the view of
women, blacks, [N]ative [A]mericans, or any group whose interpretation differs
from the dominant construct . . . .23

Smith subverts our sense of “plain meaning” by demonstrating how an
understanding of language—and the presence of multiple interpretive
communities—means that words can only be understood in the light of their
use in a given context. The judgment by Mary Louise Fellows offers a
brilliant illustration of this linguistic observation.24 In her decision she
revisits the meanings of “ordinary and necessary,” which are the standard
criteria for the deduction of business expenses.25 By looking at the use of that
phrase and at the consequences of alternative interpretations, she resolves the
issue before the court in a vastly different way than the original court.26

21

Brennen, supra note 17.

22

See, e.g., Grace E. Hart, Comment, Methodological Stare Decisis and Intersystemic Statutory
Interpretation in the Choice-of-Law Context, 124 YALE L.J. 1825, 1827 (2015) (citing Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2141–42 (2002)
(“Because statutes are merely ‘strings of words,’ statutory meaning is not inherent in the text but instead
is derived from the interaction of the text and the interpretive process.”).
23
ANDRE L. SMITH, TAX LAW AND RACIAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE: BLACK TAX 1 (2015); see Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 14 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 297 (1992) (discussing the related insights about how we can deploy multiple consciousness
to understand law).
24

Mary Louise Fellows, Welch v. Helvering, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 103.

25

Id. at 109–17.

26

Nicole Appleberry, Commentary on Welch v. Helvering, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note
2, at 102–03.
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Fourth, feminist statutory interpretation requires an appreciation of the
factual circumstances of the parties before the court. It requires judges to
demonstrate regard for the parties before them. Hierarchies inherent in
judicial processes—for example, referring to one party only by their role (as
appellant) without recognizing their humanity—are eschewed. The judge
appreciates that the parties who appear before the court are real people and
attempts to understand their circumstances before applying the law to their
“facts.” As Katherine Bartlett has reflected, a key feminist method is
“seeking insights and enhanced perspectives through collaborative . . .
engagements with others based upon personal experience and narrative.”27
Every one of the judgments in this collection reflects this concern for
the real people who find themselves before the court. To offer three
illustrations, first, in her decision on whether a married taxpayer can seek
relief from joint liability (following joint filing), Danshera Cords explores in
detail the life of Kathryn Cheshire.28 She interprets the “knowledge”
requirement in the law in a contextual way that centers Kathryn Cheshire’s
role in the filing of her joint return and her experience with her husband (in
terms of the quality and nature of their relationship).29 Similarly, in his
rewritten judgment on whether the real or personal property of the Sisseton
and Wahpeton Nation was taxable by the state, Grant Christensen removes
the racist, classist, and paternalist descriptions of the Nation and its
members.30 He affirms the humanity of the people affected by the decision,
who were excluded as parties in the original decision, in determining that the
Nation and its members have an interest in the case.31 In his review of
whether a transgender woman can deduct costs related to gender
confirmation surgery,32 David Cruz centers the experience of Rhiannon
O’Donnabhain and demonstrates compassion and understanding in his
approach to interpreting the legislation in a way that sees how the

27

Bartlett, supra note 11, at 831.

28

Danshera Cords, Cheshire v. Commissioner, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 225.

29

Id.

30

Grant Christensen, United States v. Rickert, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 64.

31

Id.

32

David B. Cruz, O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 274.
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requirement that the surgery be “for the purpose of affecting any structure or
function of the body” is more appropriate than the previous court’s focus on
disease and disorder.33 This same sensitivity to framing an issue and its effect
for people who appear before the courts is exemplified by Jennifer BirdPollan, who looks at the tax deductibility of the costs of assisted reproductive
technology.34
Fifth, feminist statutory interpretation broadens the scope of applicable
authority. Unlike many tax judgments, which rely on a very limited subset of
authorities (primarily previous judicial precedent and the provisions at issue),
feminist tax judgments embrace an expansive and often multidisciplinary
approach to authority. As Patricia Williams summarizes, “[t]he advantage of
[an interdisciplinary] approach is that it highlights factors that would
otherwise go unremarked.”35 For example, most judgments rely substantially
on the work of academics (including academics in disciplines outside of law)
and some rely on the insights that can be garnered from literature. In no
decision does an author get preoccupied with a precise hierarchy of
interpretive sources.
Sixth, feminist approaches to statutory interpretation avoid the trap of
believing that there is only one answer in applying a provision to a given set
of facts. None of the authors of the rewritten judgments seek out “the”
answer; instead, each author appears to accept that their interpretations are
the best attempt for now. This approach is also reflected in the orientation of
the book as a whole and in the statement by the editors that, “[i]f we had been
the authors or commentators, we might have taken a different tack or reached
a different conclusion.”36 This approach avoids the hubris that characterizes
at least some judicial decisions and judicial attitudes.
Seventh, feminist judges in tax cases are not ignorant of the tax
avoidance efforts undertaken by taxpayers. They steer away from formalism
and legalism in search of a better understanding of the taxpayer’s motives

33

Id. at 277.

34

Jennifer E. Bird-Pollan, Magdalin v. Commissioner, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at

35

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 7 (1992).

36

Crawford & Infanti, supra note 2, at 11.

253.
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and of the economic, social, and political consequences of approaches to
statutory interpretation that enable tax avoidance. Drawing again on Mary
Louise Fellows’s decision,
[She] remand[s] the case for the lower court to examine [the company’s] tax
treatment of its debt. The lower court should deny the taxpayer a deduction for his
payments to the creditors of [the company] to the extent that the corporation, as a
result of its debt, previously had reduced or otherwise avoided tax liability.37

Mary Louise Fellows mandates a check on the potential for tax avoidance in
the design of her decision.
Eighth, feminist statutory interpretation does not lose sight of systemic
power differences among groups and it seeks proactively to remedy that
discrimination through legal interpretation. Perhaps these authors are well
positioned to deploy this principle. As Francisco Valdes urges,
[A]s legal scholars, we possess a unique structural capacity for theorizing social
reality and law’s relationship to it: as critical legal scholars devoted to social
justice, we have the responsibility to exercise that capacity to articulate
frameworks of effective antisubordination resistance.38

To illustrate, in Mary Heen’s judgment, gender-specific mortality tables are
rejected in favor of the (equality promoting) gender-neutral tables.39 Where
a provision appears facially neutral but has discriminatory effect for
marginalized groups, feminist judges attend to the consequences of
interpretations that create or exacerbate the discrimination. Wendy Gerzog’s
decision, which looks at the qualified terminable interest property elections
and their effect on surviving spouses, exposes the stereotypes about women
that underpin the original decision in overturning its holding.40
Ninth, feminist statutory interpretation avoids drawing a hard line
between the public and private. Feminists have long taken issue with the

37

Fellows, supra note 24, at 109.

38

Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism,
Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as Cultural
Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1998).
39
Mary L. Heen, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. United States, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS,
supra note 2, at 172.
40

Wendy C. Gerzog, Estate of Clark v. Commissioner, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at

195.
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distinction between public and private and some of the more pernicious
effects for women as a result of the way that distinction takes shape in law.
As Susan Boyd urges, “[i]n trying to reframe strategies related to law, it is
necessary to avoid dichotomizing the public and private spheres. . . . [T]he
two are interconnected in a complex manner.”41 Take, for example, the
decision authored by Ann Murphy, which focuses on whether a married
couple could split income.42 In it, she scrutinizes the arrangements between
E.F. Earl and G.C. Earl and characterizes those arrangements in a way more
typical of the “private” sphere.43
Tenth, feminist statutory interpretation in the tax context situates
income tax law as a key mechanism for advancing higher-order values, for
example democracy or equality. No decision does this more beautifully than
Ruthann Robson’s rewritten opinion.44 She begins by introducing us to Edith
Windsor and Thea Spyer, the central figures in the decision, in ways that
remind one of the way you would introduce someone for whom you have
developed love or at least great affection.45 She then eviscerates the
foundations of section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, which prevented
Windsor from benefiting from the estate tax marital deduction on Spyer’s
death.46 In justifying her judgment, Robson recognizes the higher-order
functioning of tax law; namely that “tax laws, like all other laws, should have
as their mandate progress toward equality.”47
The aim of this essay was to offer some preliminary thinking about
feminist statutory interpretation, built from the excellent judgments offered
in Bridget Crawford and Anthony Infanti’s collection. Most of these
principles would seem to apply in contexts outside of tax law interpretation.

41
Susan B. Boyd, Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women, Work, and Family, 15
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 161, 184–85 (1996).
42

Ann M. Murphy, Lucas v. Earl, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 89.

43

Id.

44

Ruthann Robson, United States v. Windsor, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 306.

45

Allison Anna Tait, Commentary on United States v. Windsor, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra
note 2, at 300.
46

Id. at 301.

47

Robson, supra note 44, at 316.
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I hope many of the authors of the rewritten judgments will become judicial
appointees and we’ll be able to convert theorizing into descriptive practice.
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